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Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal 
Populism and Duterte’s Rise to Power 
Nicole Curato 
Abstract: Citizens who support populist leaders are often portrayed in 
negative terms. They are disparaged for their prejudice and naiveté, some 
even earning the label “basket of deplorables” from Hillary Clinton. 
Rodrigo Duterte’s supporters were not exempted from such criticism. In 
the 2016 Philippine presidential race, they were pejoratively labelled 
Dutertards, which pathologised their fervent and unrelenting support for 
the controversial candidate. This article interrogates such depictions by 
examining the logics that underpin Duterte’s strong public support. I 
argue that part of Duterte’s appeal hinges on “penal populism,” built on 
two political logics that reinforce each other: the politics of anxiety and 
the politics of hope. While the former foregrounds the language of crisis, 
danger and uncertainty, the latter reclaims democratic agency. The article 
examines the articulations of these logics among Duterte’s supporters 
based on ethnographic fieldwork in disaster-affected communities where 
Duterte enjoyed decisive victories.  
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Introduction 
The Trump of the East, Duterte Harry, The Punisher – these are some 
of the more colourful names the new Philippine president has earned 
from the press. “He’s a colourful guy”, said US President Barack Obama. 
Rodrigo Duterte’s unconventional political style, demonstrated by the 
profanity-laced tirades whose targets range from the president of the 
United States to Pope Francis, has led to the creation of one of the most 
notorious demagogues of the international press. He is the crude yet 
shrewd politician, the local mayor who fanned the flames of public dis-
content and became president.  
However, his supporters are equally intriguing. As the president’s 
catalogue of gaffes grows longer, his level of public support remains 
solid, manifested by a 91 per cent trust rating during his first week in 
office (Pulse Asia Research 2016a). A political economy perspective sug-
gests that Duterte’s popularity comes from a frustrated middle class that 
has been excluded from the Philippines’ economic gains in the past six 
years. Duterte’s politics of “I will” holds the promise of swifter delivery 
of services that are much needed in urban centres with crumbling public 
infrastructure. Others have taken a less charitable view and warned 
against the emergence of a fascist movement. A cursory look at online 
forums can lead one to think that Duterte’s supporters are blind follow-
ers whose moralities have been compromised. They are the personalities 
who call for killing sprees, scream bias at journalists, threaten rape and 
murder, while running the gamut of misogynistic comments. Dutertards, 
as they are pejoratively called, are pathologised as political “retards” 
pinning their hopes on a messianic leader.  
This article1 aims to critically interrogate these depictions of Duterte 
supporters by examining the political logics that drive public support 
towards a controversial president. This argument is based on a two-year 
research project among disaster-affected communities in Tacloban City, 
Philippines. I argue against the depiction of Duterte supporters during 
the campaign as fanatical devotees, and instead suggest that such support 
is a product of constant negotiation between the politics of anxiety and 
the politics of hope. While the former gains currency from the vocabu-
                                                 
1  Funding Declaration: This article is funded by the Discovery Early Research 
Career Award, Building Back Better: Participatory Governance in a Post-
Haiyan World (DE150101866) (2015–2018). 
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lary of fear, crisis and danger, the latter is animated by enactments of 
democratic agency among citizens who have been in the margins of 
politics for a long time. These logics are in tension but also mutually 
reinforce each other. The politics of anxiety constricts the space of polit-
ical discourse by invoking the tough language of war against drugs and 
criminality. It fuels what sociologists of deviance calls “penal populism”, 
a political style that builds on collective sentiments of fear and demands 
for punitive politics (Pratt 2007). I argue that fear and anxiety are not the 
only driving forces for penal populism. Part of this is the logic of hope, 
which broadens the scope of what electoral politics can achieve through 
methods that vastly depart from the machine politics that been charac-
teristic of Philippine elections. I reflect on the normative implications of 
these findings and offer conjectures on the future of the Philippine pub-
lic sphere.  
Who Laughs at a Rape Joke? The Populist  
Appeal 
A controversial speech in the Amoranto Sports Complex in Quezon City 
was a turning point for Duterte’s candidacy. In this packed stadium, 
Duterte recalled the story of a prison siege in Davao City 27 years earlier, 
which ended in a bloodbath. Duterte was mayor of Davao City at that 
time. In his usual rambling speech, he narrated the moment he saw the 
corpse of a 36-year-old Australian missionary named Jaqueline Hamill. 
During the siege, Hamill was raped, used as human shield, and brutally 
murdered, with her throat slit by one of the inmates. “What went 
through my head was that they raped her”, Duterte said. “That everyone 
had lined up to rape her. I got angry. That she was raped? Yes, that too. 
But it was that she was so beautiful – the mayor should have been first. 
What a waste.”  
A remark so controversial could have been a fatal mistake for a 
candidate who had just topped the polls, but the electorate was unde-
terred. Duterte maintained his 11-point lead over independent candidate 
Grace Poe (Pulse Asia Research 2016b). The “rape joke”, together with 
Duterte’s slew of remarks about criminals being “legitimate targets of 
assassination”, drew the ire of human rights advocates but did little to 
discredit his popularity. 
The concept of populism can help make sense of Duterte’s appeal 
to the over 16 million Filipinos who voted him into office. The precise 
definition of populism continues to be a point of contention in political 
studies. For some, populism is an ideology – albeit a “thin” one – that 
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articulates people’s resentment against ruling classes that have monopo-
lised “power, property, breeding and culture” (Shils 1956: 101; Mudde 
2004). For others, populism has no ideological core and is better defined 
by its “social base”. It refers to those who are increasingly frustrated with 
their declining status in society, rendering them vulnerable to “irrational 
protest ideologies”, which can range from fascism to racism and nation-
alism, among other things (see Lipset 1960: 173; Moffitt 2015).  
While populism’s relationship to ideology remains contentious, 
there is a broad consensus among political theorists about the logic un-
derpinning populism, which is the construction of an antagonism be-
tween “the people” and “the dangerous other” (Canovan 1999; Taggart 
2000; Laclau 2005). Such dichotomisation of the political makes it possi-
ble to compare politicians who promote left-wing politics, as in the case 
of Kirchner in Argentina, or right-wing ideologies, as in the case of 
Erdoan in Turkey (see Aytaç and Öni 2014). As S. Erdem Aytaç and 
Ziya Öni have suggested, there are “Varieties of Populism”, with some 
distinguishing the people from corrupt elites, while in some cases, popu-
lists pillory immigrants and refugees for undermining the West’s way of 
life.  
In Duterte’s case, the populist dichotomy is one between virtuous 
citizens versus hardened criminals – the scum of society who, for Duter-
te, are beyond redemption. Penal populism is a term that can capture this 
phenomenon (Pratt 2007). Originally used to describe political rhetoric 
that taps into the public’s punitive stance, penal populism results to 
harsher mechanisms for social control to address the public’s demand to 
be “tough on crime”. This is held in contrast to “penal elitism”, which 
privileges the authority of experts and professionals in shaping the crim-
inal justice system. While Duterte’s predecessor, Benigno S. Aquino, 
prioritised programmes that fight crimes in a “deliberate, programmatic 
and sustained manner” (The Official Gazette 2015), Duterte’s appeal lies in 
his promise to overcome the corrupt bureaucracy in the justice system 
and deliver peace and order in a swift and decisive manner.  
Performance is very much part of this process of claim-making, of-
ten defined by tabloid-style communication (Canovan 1999; Moffitt 
2015). For Benjamin Moffitt, the coarsening of political discourse is part 
of the populist appeal for the use of slang, swearing and political incor-
rectness – the “colourful” language Obama referred to when describing 
Duterte – are manifestations of disregard for established ways of doing 
politics. This makes the comparison between Duterte and US President 
Donald Trump plausible, although to a limited extent. Both leaders in-
voke the narrative of crisis, which legitimises their unconventional meth-
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ods of political campaigning. Duterte’s machismo – from his rough lan-
guage to his misogynistic remarks – is central to the populist perfor-
mance, for machismo is essential to the narrative of crushing the “dan-
gerous other” to save the Republic.  
While vocabulary of populism can generate insight into the kind of 
populism that is present in today’s mediatised political landscape, rela-
tively little has been said about the public in which such logic is embed-
ded. It is convenient to dismiss the populists’ constituencies as fanatics 
who fall prey to a manipulative politician. However, to pathologise pop-
ulist publics is to gloss over the dynamic characteristics of populism, 
such as the ways in which “the people” is constructed, negotiated and 
redefined. After all, populist claims to representation are a two-way street: 
“the represented play a role in choosing representatives, and representa-
tives ‘choose’ their constituents in the sense of portraying them or in 
framing them in particular, contestable ways” (Saward 2006: 301–302). 
The empirical task is to critically characterise populist publics, their rela-
tionship to the leader making populist claims, and draw from normative 
theory to reflect on these trends’ implications to democratic life.  
Populist Publics 
What then do we know about populist publics in the Philippines? 
Frederic Schaeffer’s (2002) ethnographic work among slum communities 
is a productive starting point. Schaeffer observed that poor communities 
are often disparaged for their short-sightedness and poor political dis-
cernment. They elect “immoral” leaders such as Joseph Estrada. They 
sell their votes during elections. They deliver warm bodies in political 
gatherings in exchange for 500 pesos (10 USD). EDSA Tres – a popular 
demonstration that protested Estrada’s ouster from presidency – is often 
depicted as an inferior case of political mobilisation. The masses that 
composed EDSA Tres have been dismissed as a hakot (transported) 
crowd paid off to destabilise Gloria Arroyo’s newly formed regime 
backed by a coalition of civil society groups, the church and business 
community. Estrada supporters have been described as “rock throwing, 
wailing […] pipe wielding goons”; as “polite company’s worst nightmare” 
(Severino 2001). They may be victims of the Philippine apartheid, but 
their presence in EDSA signals no more than a personality cult that 
Estrada fostered throughout his political career.  
Schaeffer’s work provides a counterpoint to such portrait of what I 
refer to as “populist publics.” He makes a distinction between the 
classed definitions of what “good politics ought to look like.” While the 
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privileged segments of society consider transparent and accountable 
governance as central to democratic practice, impoverished communities 
view consideration and kindness as constitutive of “good politics.” 
Schaeffer refers to this as class politics of dignity – the kind that shuns 
callousness and insult characteristic of politicians who only remember 
their constituencies at election time, while loyalty is bestowed to those 
who paid attention and offered a helping hand. Walden Bello’s (2001) 
analysis of EDSA Tres is consistent with this interpretation, where he 
identifies class resentments against the rich as impetus for mobilisation. 
“To say that they were simply manipulated by cynical politicians”, Bello 
argued, “is to express a half-truth and to do the masses a great injustice”. 
EDSA Tres’s populist publics value the respect accorded to them by 
leaders like Estrada and place importance on being able to identify with 
politicians who make claims on their behalf.  
The one-time presidential frontrunner Jejomar Binay built his politi-
cal career on a similar logic. Before Binay’s popularity was tarnished by a 
series of corruption scandals leading up to the 2016 presidential race, he 
developed a reputation of cultivating empathetic relationships with his 
constituents. Glenda Gloria’s (1995) account of Binay’s routine as mayor 
of Makati illustrates how the politics of dignity operates in practice. Bi-
nay began his day early, “jogging along the streets of Makati’s poor dis-
tricts and stopping by carenderias [canteens] to break bread with jeepney 
drivers and street workers”, and ended each day with “a visit to every 
funeral site in town.” While some interpreted these activities as enact-
ments of patronage and personalistic politics, they were also a manifesta-
tion of the politics of dignity where the mayor considers it his personal 
responsibility to be in communion with his constituency.  
To be sure, Schaeffer rejects the false dichotomy of choosing be-
tween “clean but exclusionary” and “dirty but inclusive” electoral politics. 
Ideally, democratic practice should be both clean and inclusive. But what 
his work exposes is the moral calculus of impoverished communities in 
conferring support to populists like Estrada as well as Binay, who are 
clearly not blameless, but nevertheless commanded the loyalty of a “col-
ony of smelly, boisterous and angry people” (Coronel 2001). Populist 
publics are not simply manipulated and desperate citizenry. Instead, they 
hinge on citizens’ moral assessments, which decide whether to bestow or 
withhold support to politicians that have granted them recognition and 
esteem.  
Could the same logic be extended to the supporters of Rodrigo 
Duterte? The answer, as the subsequent sections suggest, is a partial yes. 
Duterte’s supporters also reject the moral calculus perpetuated by the 
  Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope 97
 

 
Aquino regime, which makes a distinction between the “desente” (decent) 
and the vulgar, the clean and the corrupt. What they bring to the public 
sphere is a renegotiation of the narrative of contemporary politics by 
naming new enemies and bringing new tonalities into the political con-
versation. While Estrada and Binay’s type of populism is embedded in 
the politics of dignity, I argue that Duterte’s populist publics hinges on 
the politics of anxiety and politics of hope. Unlike Estrada and Binay’s 
case, however, Duterte’s populist publics are not class-based. His popu-
larity cuts across classes, generations, gender and geography. Duterte’s 
populism, at least as far as the electoral campaign goes, is anchored on a 
different articulation of antagonism. The character of this antagonism is 
unpacked in the rest of this article.  
Methodology 
The observations presented in the subsequent sections are based on an 
ethnographic study in Tacloban City, Leyte. The presented data draw 
from over 200 interviews and direct observations, shadowing political 
campaigns and informal conversations among communities recovering 
from Typhoon Haiyan over the course of two years. This research was 
conducted as part of a broader study that maps the forms of political 
participation in the aftermath of a mega-disaster. Electoral politics is part 
of this study, where I observed how disaster-affected communities take 
part in the first national elections since Haiyan.  
By using an ethnographic lens, the hope is to gain insights into the 
everyday articulations of political support among Duterte’s constituen-
cies. This approach is fitting to systematically examine the populist pub-
lics’ political logics – their explicit and implicit ways of claim-making, the 
forms of justification they offer for their support to Duterte and the 
taken-for-granted social conditions that makes penal populism resonate 
to broad constituencies. By “going out and getting close to the activities 
and everyday experiences of other people”, an ethnographic approach 
foregrounds the mundanity of political claim-making that other methods 
may consider “irrelevant or too ordinary” (Volo and Schatz 2004: 26). 
This micro-analysis aims to extend the conversation of Duterte’s rise to 
power, which has mainly focused on macro-orientation using the lens of 
political economy and cycles of presidential regime in the Philippines 
(Thompson 2010; Teehankee 2016). The goal of the present article is not 
to provide a rival interpretation of Duterte’s rise to power, as already 
discussed by various scholarly work (see Abinales 2016). Instead the aim 
of the subsequent sections is to shift the gaze to the everyday political 
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contexts of his supporters that makes penal populism an appealing polit-
ical style. The following sections characterise how populist publics enact 
politics and examine the character of the public sphere that lends curren-
cy to Duterte’s political style.  
Politics of Anxiety 
The 2016 presidential race did not begin as a campaign defined by crisis. 
It started as a three-way race among candidates who promised to extend 
the benefits of the Philippines’ phenomenal economic growth to the 
poor and middle classes. Campaign issues included broadening the cov-
erage of the conditional cash transfer programmes and income tax re-
form. The scope of antagonism was limited to demonising candidates, 
either for corruption scandals (Binay), citizenship issues (Poe) or incom-
petence (Roxas).  
Duterte’s entry to the political centre stage changed the tenor of the 
political conversation. A latecomer to the presidential race, Duterte 
placed the language of crisis in the foreground, depicting the Republic as 
a nation on the brink of disaster and pointing to illegal drugs as the cul-
prit. While Poe and Binay invoked the politics of personal dignity to 
distinguish themselves from the callous Aquino regime, it was Duterte’s 
dystopian narrative that shifted the discussion towards a more urgent 
solution. Crisis can be averted. Drugs, crime and corruption can be elim-
inated. All of this comes with a price, and that price can be liberal rights. 
He would close down Congress if it threatened to impeach him. He 
would declare martial law if the Supreme Court interfered. His reign 
would be bloody and many would die, but his way is the only way to 
salvation.  
The populist narrative gained traction. Low pay and illegal drugs 
emerged as the top issues that voters want their preferred presidential 
candidates to solve (Pulse Asia Research 2016c). It was a departure from 
polls that listed inflation, jobs and health as the top concerns among 
Filipinos (Pulse Asia Research 2015). A few hours after voting centres 
closed, Duterte’s opponents began conceding the race. It marked a clear 
win for the political firebrand.  
How did this happen? Could Duterte have been so masterful that 
he deluded voters into thinking that criminality and illegal drugs have 
spiralled out of control?  
I argue that part of the reason for this narrative’s success has to do 
with the latent anxiety already existing in the public sphere. By latent 
anxiety, I refer to a shared sense of distress among communities, but one 
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that remains in the background. It is present but not central, mundane 
but still worrisome, publicised but not politicised. The anguish brought 
about by the widespread use of illegal drugs is an example of latent anxi-
ety. Reports of drug busts and petty thieves caught while high on crystal 
meth are part of the popular imagination, for they are not only staple 
features of primetime newscasts and tabloids but also folded into every-
day realities in both privileged and slum communities. They are not spec-
tacular enough to merit the national government’s focus but they are 
serious enough to cause concern.  
The notion of latent anxiety became clear to me as I examined my 
field notes and interview transcripts gathered over the past two years to 
reflect on why Duterte won the presidential race. A number of my re-
spondents identified illegal drugs as a common concern in their commu-
nities and they have often been left to deal with this issue by themselves. 
For example, a project leader in one of the resettlement sites I observed 
cited the case of his neighbour addicted to shabu (crystal methampheta-
mine) as one of the most challenging issues he had to address. The 
community, reputed for having strong social bonds and norms of com-
munity participation, has internal mechanisms to discipline residents who 
violate their contracts of occupancy. In this case, the drug addict was 
asked to sign a document promising to quit his vice. Another violation 
would result to eviction, justified based on the neighbourhood’s code of 
conduct. These warnings are issued, at least in the first instance, without 
the intervention of the police. These community-based responses as-
suage fear, albeit temporarily, until the next drug-related incident comes 
along.  
While the use of illegal drugs in this particular community continues 
to be an aberration, such threat causes anxieties among residents, par-
ticularly mothers with young children. Owning a home in this neigh-
bourhood requires strict adherence to the code of conduct, such as 
maintaining norms of respect and respectability. For mothers, their sta-
tus as homeowners is something that their families earned after volun-
teering hundreds of hours of labour to build the houses, taking part in a 
series of “values formation programs” and complying with all of the 
community’s stringent rules. Their children’s vulnerability to illegal drugs 
is a cause of concern because it could cost them their homes and put all 
of their hard work to waste. This anxiety is not overtly articulated in 
interviews but alluded to in conversations, such as when one mother said 
her “only wish for her son is to stay in school and not do bad things.” 
Only when prompted about what she considers to be “bad things” did 
“droga” (drugs) come up in the conversation.  
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The same observation is recorded in my field notes, based on con-
versations with slum communities along the coast waiting to be moved 
to permanent shelters. My key informant informed me that one of my 
respondents could not make it to our scheduled interview because she 
was recovering from a broken jaw, having recently been beaten up by her 
husband. “He’s an addict,” my key informant said in hushed tones. Some 
of the fathers I have spoken to tell stories of neighbours who could not 
take part in government-sponsored livelihood programmes because they 
are “undependable,” and “always absent.” It took more conversations 
before my respondents articulated drug dependency as reason for their 
neighbours’ erratic behaviour, when one of the drug addicts they were 
referring to walked up to us in one of our chats and said something in-
coherent. The fathers laughed nervously. One whispered shabu to me. In 
one of the roughest communities in Tacloban, my respondents, particu-
larly the elderly women, would ask one of their male neighbours to es-
cort me out of the narrow streets to reach the main road. One grand-
mother said, “It is safe here, but you might take a wrong turn. [You 
might] run into addicts […] they might pick on you because you’re not 
from here.”  
I offer these observations to illustrate how “the drug problem” was 
articulated in everyday conversations before Duterte placed this issue at 
the centre of national politics. The issue of illegal drugs was present but 
latent – they were acknowledged for having precise negative conse-
quences for the community but they never really the focus of political 
conversations. Drug users were menaces who disrupt social relations, but 
it seemed that the dangers they pose were not central enough to warrant 
the sustained attention of the state. Instead, solutions to these issues 
were “privatised” – it was a problem resolved among neighbours, some-
times the local parish, sometimes NGOs and sometimes the barangay 
captain. The recurring problem itself was never solved with finality.  
It is within this context that Duterte’s penal populism gained trac-
tion. Duterte’s anti-drug crusade recognised the public’s latent anxiety 
and politicised a normalised issue. The populist logic of painting a “dan-
gerous other” gained resonance among a public that already recognised 
the dangerous other, but did not have the confidence to name and 
shame the enemy, out of fear or obligation to maintain community cohe-
sion. Penal populism draws its discursive power from its capacity to 
attribute blame to both offenders and the political establishment that 
perpetuate shared anxieties. Duterte was able to render visible concerns 
that used to lurk in the background and was able to give a voice to a 
public that felt victimised by illegal drugs. 
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When I revisited the disaster-affected communities during the cam-
paign period, some respondents were noticeably more vocal when they 
talked about their disdain for menacing neighbours – from those who go 
to sari stores with bloodshot eyes demanding cigarettes without paying, 
to those who recruit young teenage boys into the drug trade. “You better 
change now, Duterte is going to win,” said one of my informants, albeit 
in jest, to her next door neighbour, whom she suspects is also part of the 
drug trade. When I told her about my concern for Duterte’s violent 
language, the usually soft-spoken and tentative young mother of four 
confidently replied, “That’s just right!” 
Such moral judgement – considering violent talk as “just right” – 
does not represent the case of a respondent with poor ethical calcula-
tions. Part of the populist public support for aggressive rhetoric is the 
promise of justice that comes with it. Citizens who often find themselves 
hassled by petty thieves and addicts envision a sense of finality, a sense 
that their everyday tormentors will be put in their place, even if it hap-
pens at the expense of due process. After all, what use is due process if it 
entails taking part in the slow and inefficient process of the criminal 
justice system? The deficiencies of the justice system was further ex-
posed in November 2014, when news broke about the lavish lifestyle of 
drug syndicates in the New Bilibid Prison in Manila. National television 
broadcast pictures of a prison with cells converted to air-conditioned 
rooms comparable to high-end hotels, with a Jacuzzi, private gyms, a 
recording studio and its very own drug laboratory. For many, it was not 
an overstatement to say that the system was beyond repair.  
The politicisation of crime and justice is often used as a “vote-
winning playground for politicians” because they are powerful triggers 
for moral indignation among communities (Felizer 2009: 472), especially 
those who try to recover from a tragic experience like a mega-disaster by 
“doing the right thing.” A strong leader evoking a sense of control reso-
nated to communities who wished to reclaim stability in an otherwise 
fragile context. The politics of anxiety was, to a certain extent, a produc-
tive political discourse, in the sense that it gave a voice and visibility to 
otherwise latent issues of social menace caused by illegal drugs. While 
some critics raised issues about human rights and due process, these 
issues – as far as my respondents were concerned – were secondary to 
the more pressing dangers they face every day (see Thompson 2016 and 
Reyes 2016).  
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Politics of Hope  
Fear is not the only sentiment driving penal populism. Together with the 
politics of anxiety comes the politics of hope. I use the term “politics of 
hope” for two reasons. First, the populist publics’ political action is ori-
ented towards the future, investing what little resources they have to give 
voice not only to their fears but also their aspirations. In this sense, hope 
broadens citizens’ time horizons, viewing the future as something that is 
within the realm of their control rather than something that is left solely 
in the hands of elites. Second, hope captures the campaign’s positive 
orientation. In popular media, Duterte’s supporters are often caricatured 
as angry citizens resentful of the political establishment. However, equal-
ly as resonant as the resentment that goes with penal populism is a re-
claimed sense of democratic agency. It overcomes sentiments of aban-
donment, for populism broadens the space for political action. Under-
scoring political agency is crucial in this narrative in order to challenge 
the depiction of Duterte supporters as unthinking masses who are duped 
by a charismatic leader. Instead, this section portrays Duterte supporters 
as active participants in the campaign who can critically negotiate and 
reinterpret Duterte’s pronouncements.  
The politics of hope enlivens democratic agency in various ways. 
First, disaster-affected communities practice democratic agency by per-
forming reciprocity. “We’ve always been on the receiving end of help,” 
said a driver whose truck is covered with pictures of Duterte’s face. “But 
now we are in the position to help [Duterte in the campaign] […] that 
makes me feel good.” In a number of establishments in downtown 
Tacloban is an orange and white banner that reads: “It’s our turn to help 
him. Rody Duterte for President. From victims of Typhoon Yolanda 
[Haiyan].” Alive in the memory of typhoon survivors is Duterte’s quick 
response in the aftermath of Haiyan, sending Davao’s world-class rapid 
response team to help in relief operations. The story goes that Duterte 
arrived with no fanfare, unlike most politicians who “come here, have 
their picture taken, upload [the photo] on Facebook and then leave”. 
This observation is widely shared among my respondents. A distinction 
is made between “trapos” (traditional politicians) who came to Tacloban 
to only to “talk to the media” versus Duterte “who was present to actu-
ally do something.” The talk versus action distinction is crucial in under-
standing why populist publics are forgiving towards Duterte’s sometimes 
offensive off-the-cuff remarks. The attention Duterte extended to my 
respondents outweighs his coarse language. “God must have been 
somewhere else,” said Duterte emotionally in a media interview when he 
came back to Davao from Tacloban. His empathetic description of 
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ground zero appeared as a stark contrast to President Aquino who was 
portrayed by my respondents as unaffected and “sleeping on the job” as 
Tacloban recovered from the world’s strongest storm. “Did you remem-
ber what the president said?” one barangay captain asked me, “Remem-
ber, he said, ‘but you’re still alive, right?’ That really hurt my feelings. As 
if we have to thank him that we did not die. But Duterte treated us like 
human beings,” she continued. Supporting Duterte, in this sense, is a 
moral act, a fulfilment of an obligation to help someone who has helped 
them in the past.  
Their relationship of reciprocity with Duterte can be held in con-
trast to their relationship with the Liberal Party candidate Manuel Roxas. 
The former secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Govern-
ment is held in contempt not only for his perceived ineptitude in disaster 
response, but also for appearing to bully Tacloban’s distressed mayor at a 
closed-door meeting. Video of that meeting was leaked on social media 
and showed Roxas demanding that Mayor Alfred Romualdez hand over 
control of the city. “You have to understand, you’re a Romualdez, and 
the President is an Aquino,” Roxas told the mayor, referring to the his-
torical rivalry between the two families. At that moment, Roxas personi-
fied the Aquino government’s malicious abandonment of Tacloban – the 
city, after all, is a Romualdez bailiwick. Duterte, in contrast, exemplified 
the virtues of a public servant who aided constituencies well outside the 
scope of his responsibilities. This narrative shapes the moral calculation 
of populist publics to return the favour to a man who did not abandon 
Tacloban.  
Second, taking part in Duterte’s campaign allows communities to 
reclaim their esteem as citizens who can take charge of their political 
destiny. Elections in the Philippines are often defined by machine poli-
tics where “local bosses” deliver votes through vote buying and intimida-
tion (Sidel 1999). Even as Duterte started gaining ground in the polls, 
major political parties claim that electoral machinery will ultimately de-
fine the outcomes of the elections. The populist publics that Duterte 
inspired repudiated such a system. Walden Bello (2016) described it as an 
electoral insurgency, where a resentful public rejected (electoral) politics 
as usual. However, this must be read with caution. The Philippine Centre 
for Investigative Journalism reported that Duterte’s campaign was bank-
rolled by 13 large donors, which challenges the narrative that Duterte’s 
campaign was run on a shoestring budget (Ilagan and Mangahas 2016).  
While acknowledging the role of big business in funding Duterte’s 
campaign, it is still worth recognising the citizen-led political action that 
disrupts traditional campaign practices. Populist publics challenged mon-
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ey politics through modest ways of funding sorties and campaign para-
phernalia. Local entrepreneurs mobilised their networks to provide mini-
vans, sound systems, truck ads, banners and catering for campaign rallies. 
Elections are peak seasons for small entrepreneurs to make profits, but 
in this case, “we need to literally put our money where our mouth is,” as 
one printing press owner puts it. Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) also 
played a role in democratising funding sources for Duterte’s campaign. 
Wristbands saying “Duterte | Atin” to “pre” (Duterte | He’s one of us) 
were ordered and paid for by a group of nurses from Jeddah who con-
tributed USD 20 each so their families could distribute the campaign 
paraphernalia during graduation parties. March is “graduation season” in 
the Philippines – two months before the elections. As a cashier at a re-
mittance agency explained: 
It’s March now, usually they [OFWs] send money [for] graduation 
[expenses], but now they’re sending money, there, for printing 
ballers [bracelets] for Duterte, or, those t-shirts. When Pope Fran-
cis was here, we were selling memorabilia. But Pope Francis did 
not get people to order customised memorabilia, using their own 
designs […] and spend their own money. It’s one thing to like a 
person, but it’s another thing to spend your money to [show sup-
port to] that person. Duterte made people spend!  
Contributing funding for Duterte’s campaign also had its manifestations 
among slum communities. When Duterte held his campaign sortie in 
Tacloban, residents who were struggling to make ends meet found ways 
to commute to the plaza and listen to Duterte’s speech. This is not an 
easy achievement for communities that have been consistently dispar-
aged by political elites, who limit their electoral participation to serving 
as hakot in campaign rallies. “I still went to [the other candidate’s] sortie 
because they paid us, but the feeling was different with Duterte,” said 
one of my key informants. She continues: 
I really found a way to get to RTR [plaza], I persuaded pedicab 
drivers to give me a lift [for free], someone, someone I don’t 
know, finally, he said yes, and so we went and waited for Duterte. 
It’s really worth going [to the rally]. I cried when I saw him. I 
don’t know why. I’m proud I was there. I really found a way to be 
there […] I don’t know what happened to the pedicab driver, 
maybe he did not earn anything that day. But I’m sure he wanted 
to be there too.  
Such a sense of pride also extends to middle-class voters, such as a print-
ing press owner who produced Duterte posters at a loss.  
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I’ve lost everything [from Haiyan] […] but I am not selfish. I am 
not obsessed with money. I am proud that, [even if] it’s only now 
that I can earn a profit, I let go [of the opportunity] because I 
want to support Duterte. I don’t want others to say I just did it 
because I made money. I want to be proud [that] I sacrificed [profit] 
for our future president [emphasis added].  
These statements, among others, illustrate how taking part in the cam-
paign helped disaster-affected communities regain their esteem as active 
citizens. The pride the respondents refer to is drawn from a deliberate 
choice. Personal goals of recovery were sacrificed in favour of a political 
goal. Whether it meant cadging rides to see Duterte or giving up profit at 
a particularly lucrative period, supporting Duterte demands imagination 
for citizens to enact their political support.  
Third, democratic agency is manifest in citizens’ construction of 
their collective aspiration. The politics of hope hinges on Duterte’s 
promise that uses the language of urgency. While the politics of fear 
gains currency from the immediate need for punitive measures to quell 
criminality, the politics of hope opens up spaces for citizens to visualise 
better conditions within their lifetime. Duterte’s promise of eradicating 
corruption and reducing red tape “in three to six months” is particularly 
meaningful for communities that have been waiting for emergency shel-
ter assistance for two years, or those waiting to have access to potable 
water for decades. Compared to the issue of drugs, which has been a 
latent concern, the immediate issue of delivering basic services to disas-
ter-affected communities has been in the foreground. Duterte’s “politics 
of I will” and his contempt for bureaucracy enables citizens to imagine 
their futures and make corresponding plans. One of my key informants 
during the campaign volunteered to organise Duterte supporters in the 
region. He was a seafarer who, after Duterte won, opted to stay in the 
country because “change is coming.”  
However, to characterise the politics of hope is not to romanticise 
the fragmented yet overwhelming public support that propelled Duterte 
to the presidency. Duterte’s campaign is far from blameless. Local politi-
cians have quickly jumped ship to support Duterte, evidenced by sample 
ballots enclosed with cash for vote buying that placed Duterte’s name in 
the field for president. The vibrancy of campaigns offline does not ab-
solve the vile, violent and sometimes untruthful commentary of Duter-
te’s supporters online (see Business World 2016). These practices in both 
electoral politics and the public sphere indeed warrant critical assessment. 
However, these issues must not take credit away from the victory that 
populist publics can claim over formulaic politics that very few political 
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commentators and political strategists have predicted. Populist publics’ 
political gestures may appear modest but, when contextualised in the 
history of electoral politics in the Philippines, are not insignificant. The 
politics of hope enlivens citizens’ political efficacy and esteem, some-
thing that classic patronage or machine politics does not necessarily 
deliver. This story, at least as far as this limited case study is concerned, 
warrants recognition in contemporary political studies.  
Conclusion 
This article argues that underpinning Duterte’s penal populism are seem-
ingly opposing, yet mutually reinforcing, logics of the politics of fear and 
the politics of hope. While the politics of fear exposes citizens’ latent 
anxieties, the politics of hope foregrounds the role of democratic agency, 
esteem and collective aspirations. I hope that, by underscoring these two 
logics that support Duterte’s rise to power, I have characterised how 
populism is a negotiated relationship between the populist and his pub-
lics – a relationship that runs much deeper than one-way manipulation 
and demagoguery. Populism, as the previous sections demonstrate, gives 
voice to pre-existing frustrations as well as life to new possibilities for 
conducting electoral politics. Support for populist leaders is a product of 
moral calculations the public makes, given their social status and broader 
political contexts. To this extent, populism can claim modest legacies for 
democratic practice, especially when it disrupts the electoral system that 
is partial to money and political machinery.  
However, making this argument does not mean dismissing the view 
of populism as a pathology of democracy. Indeed, penal populism also 
creates a legacy of exclusion and divisiveness in liberal democracies. 
Although penal populism does give a voice to citizens’ frustrations, it 
also silences the perspective of “the dangerous other” for they are con-
sidered enemies that should be eradicated. For example, this case study 
does not include the views of the families of suspected drug dealers who 
have been gunned downed in Tacloban (Philippine Daily Inquirer 2016). 
The punitive foundations of the politics of fear limits the public’s imagi-
nation for measured and systematic responses to the drug problem. In-
stead, it promotes spectacular short-term solutions to complex problems 
at the expense of human rights.  
The politics of hope could also produce disproportionate optimism 
that could ultimately result in unmet expectations and further frustra-
tions to electoral politics. It is not the first time the Philippines has en-
countered populist leaders, and this may not be the last time that a popu-
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list leader will fall short of expectations. But if there is one lesson that 
the theory and practice of populism in the past decades can teach both 
academic scholarship and democratic citizenship, it is that populism is 
best understood with nuance and reflection, instead of replicating bina-
ries that distinguish the virtuous and the dangerous. Populism is a con-
ceptual category that is best understood in shades of grey, for black and 
white only serves to obfuscate the study of democracy.  
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